Beijing’s ‘fisher militia’ menaces the South China Sea. The US must lean in

Fishing vessels have been used for war for as long as they have existed. Abundant, cheap, adaptable, seaworthy, discreet and with a combatant status that is hard to define and therefore attack, they are an ideal hybrid warfare option.  ‘o’

China, perhaps as one would expect for a country with enough maritime ambition to build the equivalent in tonnage of an entire Royal Navy every four years, is taking this to the next level. China has a semi-militarised fishing fleet of more than 3000 boats, the Maritime Militia, intended to act as an “armed mass organisation composed of civilians retaining their regular jobs” tasked with assisting the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) “by performing security and logistics functions in war”. In other words, spying, blocking, riding off, using water cannons, shining lasers, cutting cables and – of course – minelaying. This fisherman militia is ideal for conducting constabulary-level operations deliberately configured to sit below the military threshold for intervention. It’s textbook grey zone.

The journey from the Maritime Militia’s inception in the 1950s to now hasn’t all been plain sailing. A combination of persistent underfunding and a developing realisation that they could earn more by actually fishing has led the militia skippers to occasionally defy Beijing. The Distant Water Fishing fleet, another 4500 boats, form a key part of China’s aspiration to become a maritime great power, yet their often illegal activities off West Africa and Latin America have created tension in areas where China would rather cooperate. Command and control remains important even in the grey zone. 

Closer to home, China’s often outlandish claims and its ongoing construction of bases and facilities around the South China Sea has led to many clashes between its fishing vessels and other navies over the years. These have included the 2009 harassment of USNS Impeccable (an unarmed US support vessel) the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff against the Philippines, and the 2014 oil rig clash with Vietnam. China’s position is that it owns the South China Sea up to the “nine dash line” – more or less the whole Sea and all its disputed shoals and islands.

In 2015 the US Navy started Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the Sea, exercising the internationally recognised right to operate in international waters and to conduct innocent passage. This did not spell the end of clashes, but things were steady rather than escalating. 

However, in February of this year, water cannons and lasers were fired at ships attempting to bring supplies to the Philippine Navy ship Sierra Madre, which has been aground on the Second Thomas Shoal since 1999 and is maintained as a military outpost by Phillipine marines. In July, 48 Chinese fishing vessels swarmed the Iroquois Reef whilst some of their coastguard vessels manoeuvred dangerously close to Philippine Navy ships. Washington described the swarm operation as “coercive and risky”, Beijing called it “professional and restrained”. Either way, the Maritime Militia and the Chinese Coastguard were coordinating. New weapons, new tactics.

Landing exercises last week with the Philippine, Australian and US navies passed without incident. Similarly, Japan, the US, Australia and the Philippines held naval drills in response to China’s ongoing attempts to obstruct Manila’s supply activities. These exercises were long-planned and reporting that they were in response to another water cannon incident off the Second Thomas Shoal earlier this month was incorrect, but the direction of travel is clear – the more countries push back, the more opportunities there are for ‘The Militia’ to cause mischief. Discussions in the region are maturing as to how to make occasional exercises into regular patrols. As ever, the US remains at their core. 

The UK has a role too. On the continuum between political support and fighting power, our contribution inevitably leans towards the former, but should not be underestimated. 

The role of Minister for the Indo-Pacific was created nearly a year ago with the idea of pulling together political and diplomatic efforts across Whitehall. This was obvious, but absent – until she stood it up. The Australian, UK and US submarine deal (Aukus) grabs current headlines but the Five Powers Defence Agreement (FPDA) between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom remains significant. At the soft power end, there is the Japan-UK Reciprocal Access Agreement and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CTPP), both designed to expand trade options. If you believe in a rules-based order and freedom of navigation at sea then the UK’s work here is important. 

In terms of hard power things are less rosy, but it is worth remembering that this conflict is currently in what military planners would call Phase Zero – shaping ops. This phase is ideally about setting the conditions to prevent war in the first place, something that Navies are inherently good at, often without even leaving port. The two Royal Navy patrol vessels currently in the region are a key part of this and doing it well. Those who wish those ships had more guns, or that we had a carrier group permanently stationed there, often do so imagining that we are already at war. 

For the commander at sea, getting involved with fishing vessels bent on mischief causes a legal headache. You have ‘the inherent right to self-defence’ but you don’t want to be the one that accidentally starts the war. Maritime operations in the Persian Gulf have for decades been conducted under the headline of ‘disciplined restraint’ to avoid unintended escalation. It has worked but executing it can leave you with an uncomfortable dilemma as the attack craft of the Revolutionary Guard approach you at high speed. This isn’t indecision, it’s operating within your legally obligated rules of engagement but also knowing the exact moment that the situation has transitioned to self-defence. A well-run militia will be able to exploit this seam. 

For example, a fishing vessel actively laying mines is an act of war and could be engaged immediately, but what if you get there too late and they are now unarmed? Can you engage in self-defence if they are trying to ram you? Fishing vessels are made of thicker steel than warships, as those who took part in the Cod Wars long ago will attest. Depending on what mission you have been sent to achieve, maybe you are better off running away. You’re still trying to prevent conflict at this stage, not start it. 

This scenario played out in 2010 as a Chinese trawler rammed two Japanese Coastguard vessels. Japanese restraint in the face of this provocation paid off – it turned out the trawler skipper was drunk. HMS Defender showed similar control in the Black Sea whilst being harassed by the Russian Coastguard in 2021 – as has every coalition warship in the Persian Gulf for the last twenty years. Phase Zero is not an environment for captains with itchy trigger fingers. 

How should one respond to instances of theft, piracy or harassment? Or at the passive end of the operating spectrum, electronic warfare, jamming and surveillance? What if you’re conducting anti-submarine ops in international waters and a fishing vessel starts shining a laser at your helicopter and another closes on your towed array? Are you shooting at them or not? 

All these situations need to be wargamed between the lawyers and ministers of navies who wish to operate in contested Phase Zero waters because warship captains need to instinctively know their legal engagement parameters before they arrive. It’s too late to be having discussions on how the Geneva Convention covers civilian crews that are directly participating in hostilities when your helicopter pilot says he’s been dazzled or blinded and might not be able to land back on deck. Similarly, you need to learn the relationship between normal maritime law and the Law of Armed Conflict at sea before you’re surrounded by trawlers, not during.

China’s aims in the South China Sea are so clear (to them) and yet so at odds with international law, and their behaviour against other countries in the region so increasingly bellicose, that it is hard to imagine how the situation there resolves itself. 

In the meantime, both sides are conducting shaping operations along traditional lines. The US, UK and others are alliance-building with key partners in the region, creating agreements and providing diplomatic assurances backed up by military activity as resources allow. 

Meanwhile, China continues to normalise its illegal activities there knowing full well that what should be a constabulary response to their moves will often be a military one, with all the complexities that incurs. 

And what better way to do this than having several thousand fishing vessels at your disposal to achieve your aims below the threshold required to trigger military intervention. It’s classic grey zone: disruptive, not kinetic, difficult to counter and only going to get worse.

Tom Sharpe is a former Royal Navy officer. He commanded an anti-submarine frigate on operations in the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, involving live contact with Russian ships and submarines, and has seen service in other contested waters